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WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE TAX 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS? 
Pamela Brooks Gann* 
SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE 
UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM. By Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and 
Alan S. Murray. New York: Random House. 1987. Pp. xxii, 309. 
$18.95. 
What do you think of the Tax Reform Act of 1986? Whatever 
your pre8ent opinion, it will likely be better informed after reading 
Showdown at Gucci Gulch. 1 Jeffrey Birnbaum and Alan Murray are 
reporters for the Wall Street Journal who covered the political process 
leading to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. These writ-
ers have embellished their newspaper coverage from 1984 through 
1986 with extensive personal interviews of all major participants in the 
tax reform process except President Reagan (p. xix). In Showdown at 
Gucci Gulch they present a chronological, political narrative of the 
events leading to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. They 
begin with Senator Bill Bradley's introduction of the Fair Tax Act in 
1982 and end with President Reagan's signing of the 1986 Act on the 
South Lawn of the White House. 
Several themes emerge from their political narrative: (1) the signif-
icance of the personalities, attitudes, and leadership qualities of indi-
viduals with major roles in the tax legislative process; (2) the impact of 
lobbyists and sources of campaign funds on the members of the tax 
writing congressional committees; and (3) the practical constraints im-
posed on the process by the desire of the President and others not to 
use the reform process to raise income taxes. 
Other themes could have been drawn from their narrative but were 
not: What happened to the objective of simplification in the income 
tax system? Was the 1986 Act distributionally neutral across income 
classes? What happened to the so-called "tax expenditure budget"? 
In this review, I will address each of these included and omitted 
themes. I will not summarize the authors' chronological narrative, 
but will draw on pertinent parts of their narrative to develop my dis-
* Dean and Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. A.B. 1970, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1973, Duke University. - Ed. I thank my colleague Rich· 
ard L. Schmalbeck for his comments on an earlier draft. 
1. The name "Gucci Gulch" refers to the hallway outside the Senate Finance Committee 
room, which is filled with lobbyists during tax legislation hearings. This name first appeared in 
1982 in reference to the expensive Italian shoes that were worn by the lobbyists. P. 32. 
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cussion of themes. Their well-told story awaits the reader of the book 
itself. 
I. THEMES IMPORTANT TO THE AUTHORS 
A. Force of Personality 
Mr. President, you came to this [tax reform] because you were an actor 
who paid at the 90-percent rate; that's why you want a lower rate. I came 
to this because I was a depreciable asset. [p. 26; Senator Bill Bradley to 
President Ronald Reagan] 
There was going to be a bill, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman 
of House Ways and Means Committee said, and as chairman, he would 
decide who got - and who didn't get - transition rules. [p. 146] 
The bookends of the authors' chronological, political narrative are 
appropriately Senator Bill Bradley and President Reagan. In between 
also appears an interesting story about other major figures in the exec-
utive and legislative branches. According to Birnbaum and Murray, 
these individuals' force of personality was critical to the enactment of 
the 1986 Act.2 
Senator Bradley is described as developing a distaste for the tax 
system when he became a professional basketball player and was asked 
by his attorney during his first contract negotiation: "How much do 
you want to pay in taxes?" (p. 26). It was explained to Senator Brad-
ley that he could take his compensation in various forms, many of 
which would avoid current tax. Senator Bradley's aversion to the in-
come tax turned into a significant legislative effort to modify, fairly 
radically, the income tax. Several objectives of his tax reform plan 
distinguished it from previous reform efforts: 
(1) The plan was revenue neutral, neither raising nor lowering to-
tal income tax receipts, in order to avoid ideological battles. 
(2) The plan was distributionally neutral across income classes, ex-
cept for providing some tax relief to the poor. 
(3) The plan did not raise taxes on corporations in order to pay for 
individual tax cuts. 
( 4) The top rate was sharply reduced - down to at least 30 per-
cent - without providing a windfall to the wealthy (p. 29). 
Few people noticed when Senator Bradley introduced his bill for a 
Fair Tax Act in 1982. His political prescience established, however, 
the practical ground rules upon which any future, successful tax re-
form effort had to be based. The 1986 Act purportedly had all of these 
four characteristics except the third, because it shifted a significant 
2. Pp. 133, 286-87. It was accomplished by the force of male personality alone: no woman 
plays any important role in the White House, in the Treasury Department, in Congress, or on 
staffs of the tax-writing committees. 
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portion of income tax receipts from individuals to corporations. These 
various constraints are elaborated upon below. 
President Reagan was the single other most important personality 
in the tax reform process. The quantity of tax legislation during the 
eight years of the Reagan presidency will be one of the administra-
tion's most remarkable legislative legacies. 3 Significant tax acts were 
passed in 1981, 1982, 1984, and 1986. Not only is the number of ma-
jor acts impressive, but the scope of the acts has been impressive as 
well: they have affected several thousands of subsections of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. For example, it was estimated that the 1984 Act 
alone modified 2,245 subsections of the Code. 4 
Aside from their quantity and pervasiveness, these acts made dra-
matic adjustments in the income tax. The primary concerns about the 
income tax in the 1960s and early 1970s had been fairness and equity. 
When President Reagan entered office in 1981, the concerns about the 
income tax had shifted to efficiency and capital formation. It was ar-
gued that lower tax rates would enhance savings and capital accumu-
lation, and this, in turn, would lead to greater productivi'ty and 
growth. 5 This shift in concern is not surprising if one observes the 
economic statistics in President Carter's final economic report: The 
real gross national product declined 0.3 percent in 1980; unemploy-
ment was 7.1 percent; and the consumer price index rose 12.9 percent 
in the twelve month period ending November, 1980.6 
President Reagan made lower taxes a major domestic policy objec-
tive in his first administration.7 This objective was so important that 
the White House orchestrated the tax efforts, rather than leaving them 
to the Treasury Department. The administration's efforts immediately 
paid off. In 1981, Congress enacted the largest income tax cut in U.S. 
history:8 individual income tax rates were reduced approximately 23 
percent, the maximum marginal individual tax rate was reduced from 
70 percent to 50 percent, and corporate tax rates were reduced indi-
rectly by lowering to approximately zero the effective tax rates on in-
3. I am also willing to predict that another will be the free trade agreement with Canada. 
4. Apolinsky, The Changes Just Cost Money, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1986, at CS, col. 1. I am 
waiting for someone to calculate that number for the 1986 Act, but without question, it will be 
similarly large. 
5. See Gann, Neutral Taxation of Capital Income: An Achievable Goal?. LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1985, at 77. 
6. See EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 138, 271, 293, (1981). 
7. On February 5, 1981, President Reagan presented a televised address from the White 
House in which he proposed a reduction in individual taxes of 30% over a three-year period. He 
also recommended accelerated depreciation to encourage investment and growth. See Address to 
the Nation on the Economy, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 79, 82 (Feb. 5, 1981). On February 18, he sent 
the details of his tax cut proposal to the Congress. See White House Report on the Program for 
Economic Recovery, 1981 PUB. PAPERS l16-32 (Feb. 18, 1981). 
8. J. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 221 
(1985). 
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come earned on tangible personal property.9 Capital-intensive, 
profitable corporations could become tax-exempt. Corporations with-
out profits were nevertheless permitted to take advantage of these capi-
tal investment incentives through so-called "safe harbor leasing," a 
method by which capital investment incentives could be transferred to 
nonprofitable taxpayers on a basis that purportedly equalized the util-
ity of these benefits to both profitable and nonprofitable firms. 10 
These changes were packaged in an act called the "Economic Re-
covery Tax Act of 1981."11 Because of the recession, it was almost 
immediately recognized that revenue receipts would be far too small 
under the 1981 Act. In response, Congress enacted the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 198212 (an excessively self-congratu-
latory title even by congressional standards), which substantially re-
duced the accelerated depreciation benefits of the 1981 Act and 
repealed safe-harbor leasing. 
Two important factors emerged from the 1981-1982 tax legislative 
process. First, the President's 1981 objectives - to lower individual 
rates by 30 percent over three years and to lower the effective corpo-
rate tax rate paid by corporations through accelerated capital recovery 
allowances - had to be achieved politically in exchange for a congres-
sional laundry list of special interest tax benefits, which punctured fur-
ther holes in the tax base. Second, the tax cuts significantly reduced 
total tax receipts, so that the income tax could be modified in a more 
dramatic way: the same amount of revenue could be raised by lower-
ing the rates to at least 30 percent and broadening the base. The stage 
had been established for Senator Bradley's tax reform plan. Special 
interest groups could be ignored if the rates were low enough, and a 
bipartisan group for tax reform in Congress might be forged between 
those who favored lower rates and those who wanted to get rid of tax 
expenditures in the tax base. 
Largely out of political concerns that the Democrats would make 
tax policy an issue in the presidential election, President Reagan an-
nounced in his 1984 State of the Union Address that he was asking 
Treasury Department Secretary Donald Regan to make recommenda-
tions by December 1984 for tax reform to "make the tax base broader, 
so that personal tax rates could come down, not go up" (p. 41). Ap-
plying his characteristic management style, President Reagan then 
delegated the entire responsibility for a low rate, broad-based tax re-
form proposal to the Treasury Department, which managed to stay 
out of the political limelight during the 1984 election year (pp. 43, 46). 
9. See Gann, supra note 5, at 97. 
10. See Auerbach & Warren, Jr., Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe 
Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752 (1982). 
11. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
12. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of26 U.S.C.). 
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The Treasury's efforts were directed by Secretary Regan, Assistant 
Secretary for Tax Policy Ronald Pearlman, and Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Tax Analysis Charles McLure. With no restrictions im-
posed upon them, except the commitment of President Reagan not to 
touch the mortgage interest deduction (p. 57), they proceeded to pro-
duce an elegant, low-rate (35 percent maximum marginal individual 
rate), broad-based income tax reform proposal, later known as "Trea-
sury I." 
Treasury I's most interesting features were the attempt to measure 
correctly income from capital (which required measurement of eco-
nomic depreciation), indexing the tax base for inflation, repeal of the 
special lower rate for capital gains, and elimination of the double taxa-
tion on corporate earnings. In contrast, Senator Bradley's proposal 
reduced capital allowance recovery incentives and repealed the special 
rate for capital gains, but it did not attempt any of the other necessary 
features of an income tax that attempts to measure capital income 
correctly.13 
Treasury I also had two additional, controversial features: first, it 
proposed to repeal the deduction for all state and local taxes, a major 
base-broadening proposal, and, second, in order to keep individual tax 
rates low, it shifted from individuals to corporations approximately 
$150 billion of taxes over a five-year period (pp. 48, 60). 
This proposal sharply contrasted with the 1981 Act, which had 
lowered to zero the effective corporate tax on capital intensive indus-
tries through accelerated capital recovery allowances. This earlier leg-
islative largess would be reversed in exchange for a lower across-the-
board corporate tax rate of 33 percent under Treasury I (p. 59). The 
Treasury Department's shift in emphasis notwithstanding, President 
Reagan remained committed to the idea of tax reform, largely because 
of his emphasis on lowered marginal individual tax rates. He directed 
his new Treasury Secretary, James Baker, to adjust Treasury I to make 
it more politically palatable. 
The so-called Treasury II plan resulted from a politically prag-
matic group in Treasury led by Secretary Baker. This proposal was 
less pristine than Treasury I, measuring capital income far less per-
fectly and retaining several of the·Code's special interest provisions. It 
also had the flaws of losing revenue and providing the highest average 
tax rate percentage reductions for the wealthiest individuals. Treasury 
II was therefore neither revenue nor distributionally neutral (pp. 86-
89). 
Two extremely important facts emerged from the executive branch 
work during 1984 and 1985: President Reagan still strongly supported 
13. See Gann, supra note 5, at 135-48 (comparing the provisions concerning taxation of capi-
tal income in Treasury I with those in Senator Bradley's Fair Tax Act). 
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tax reform, and the basic thrust of the reform was still substantially to 
lower rates and to broaden the base. This was exactly the approach 
earlier adopted by Senator Bradley. 
The remainder of Showdown at Gucci Gulch tracks the bill through 
the congressional process. Here too, personalities were significant. 
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-
111.) had decided to support the tax reform efforts. He viewed tax re-
form as a "Democratic" issue, emphasizing fairness and simplicity of 
the tax laws (p. 99). He also felt that tax legislation during President 
Reagan's first term had largely been determined by Senator Robert 
Dole, then chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Rostenkowski 
wanted to reestablish the importance of the House Ways and Means 
Committee and himself as its head (pp. 102-03). 
Senator Bob Packwood (R-Ore.) chaired the Senate Finance Com-
mittee. He seemed particularly ill-suited to direct a tax bill that would 
substantially broaden the tax base. Senator Packwood was identified 
as a supporter of using the tax laws to accomplish social policy objec-
tives and had been particularly active in supporting fringe benefit and 
timber industry provisions in the Code (pp. 183, 189). He had been 
quoted earlier as statiRg, "I sort of like the tax code the way it is." 
Nevertheless, as a member of the Republican party, he could not op-
pose President Reagan's desire to proceed with a tax bill. 
The book provides a detailed account of the agonizing start-up 
problems faced by both Chairmen: Few committee members really 
supported new tax legislation, and few were committed to broadening 
the base and eliminating special interest provisions. Early in its pro-
cess, the Ways and Means Committee passed a provision increasing 
the bad-debt reserve deduction for banks. Chairman Rostenkowski 
was livid and threw down his pencil in disgust. Meanwhile, it was 
reported that the bank lobbyist's cry of victory - "We won! We 
won!" - echoed in the hall (p. 125). 
Ultimately, both Rostenkowski and Packwood relied upon four 
factors to succeed. First, each viewed this tax reform effort as pro-
pelled by negative motivation. That is, few members of Congress re-
ally wanted to support this tax legislation, but they were more 
concerned with being tagged with failure (pp. 127, 223, 237). Both 
Chairmen played on this negative motivation to keep the reform pro-
cess in motion. Second, both Chairmen insisted that their bills had to 
be revenue neutral and that any Committee member offering an 
amendment that lost revenue had to be willing to swap this offer for 
another that raised an equivalent amount of revenue (pp. 123, 229-30, 
237). Third, both Chairmen took great pains to manage the bill on the 
floors of their respective houses (pp. 154-75, 243-52). 
Finally, to an unprecedented degree, both Packwood and Ros-
tenkowski were willing to agree to so-called "targeted transitional pro-
1202 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1196 
visions" to guarantee votes in support of their bills (pp. 146, 240-43, 
277). These legislative provisions are designed to give tax relief to spe-
cific taxpayers supported by a particular Representative or Senator. 
They are usually written in such a way that the targeted beneficiary is 
not identifiable on the face of the statute. For example, a special rule 
for General Motors refers to "an automobile manufacturer that was 
incorporated in Delaware on October 13, 1916" (p. 241). These rules 
then typically provide a special grandfather clause that exempts par-
ticular companies, assets, or transactions from a provision in the new 
legislation. Such special transitional rules result from political horse 
trading. The targeted transitional provisions of the bill divided tax-
payers between those with special access to particular members of 
Congress who, in turn, had a particular relationship with Chairmen 
Rostenkowski and Packwood, and those similarly situated taxpayers 
without such access or without the political savvy to seek it. These 
unsavory, targeted tax expenditures, explained by public choice the-
ory, established an unfortunate quantitative precedent which likely 
will be hard to resist in future tax legislative processes.14 
B. Lobbyists and Campaign Financing 
It's not clear yet what the tax-reform fight is going to mean for the average 
taxpayer, but Washington special-interest lobbyists have just landed in hog 
heaven. [p. 177; Fred Wertheimer, President of Common Cause] 
Beneficiaries of special income tax provisions find it worthwhile to 
pay "Gucci-clad" lobbyists and to make campaign contributions to 
influence votes for the retention or exclusion of particular tax provi-
sions. With almost all special interest tax legislation up for grabs in 
1985 and 1986, the number of lobbyists was immense (pp. 177-79). 
The money contributed to congressional campaigns during the tax re-
form process was staggering, and the largest sums of money were 
given to the members of the tax-writing committees. Chairman Bob 
Packwood received approximately $1 million from special interest 
political action committees (PACs) from January 1, 1985 to June 30, 
1986 (p. 182). In 1985 (a nonelection year), congressional tax writers 
received $19.8 million in campaign contributions. The twenty mem-
bers of the Senate Finance Committee received $11.8 million, and the 
thirty-six members of the Ways and Means Committee received nearly 
$8 million (p. 180). 
In addition to campaign contributions, congressional tax writers 
were favorite speakers around the country, for which they received 
"honoraria." In 1985, Bob Dole was the top honoraria recipient in the 
14. See, e.g., 37 TAX NOTES 523 (1987) (summarizing taxpayer-specific provisions contained 
in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, a bill reported out by the House Ways and 
Means Committee). 
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Senate, receiving approximately $128,000 (pp. 181-82), and the twenty 
members of the Senate Finance Committee earned more than 
$660,000 in honoraria. 
Birnbaum and Murray provide the reader with these impressive 
figures and sprinkle their tale with anecdotal evidence of direct rela-
tionships between lobbying, campaign contributions, honoraria, and 
voting. The writers intend for the reader to conclude from this abun-
dant information that such efforts typically pay off: lobbyists success-
fully bought votes from the selling tax-writing committee members. 
The authors commend the 1986 Act, however, as a triumph over most 
lobbyists for special interest groups (pp. 287-88). 
More cautious writers correctly note that this type of evidence il-
lustrates that lobbyists played some role in the 1986 tax-writing pro-
cess, but that an exact cause-and-effect analysis is difficult to prove. 15 
Nevertheless, the story told by Birnbaum and Murray vividly illus-
trates that, like the clown fish and the sea anemone, lobbyists and tax 
writers have developed a symbiotic, economic relationship that did not 
end with the 1986 Act. 
C. Revenue Neutrality Constraint 
We're getting misinformation, inaccurate information, untrustworthy in-
formation. We can no longer rely on what we're getting. [p. 275; Senator 
Bob Packwood criticizing David Brockway, Director of the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation] 
Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts. [p. 275; 
Senator Patrick Moynihan, a member of the Senate Finance Committee] 
The budget deficit prevented serious consideration of any tax re-
form proposal that lost revenue. The need to develop bipartisan sup-
port for tax reform prevented serious consideration of any tax reform 
proposal that increased revenue. Consequently, both the Treasury De-
partment and the tax-writing committees worked under the constraint 
of revenue neutrality. This in turn put tremendous pressure on the 
small group of revenue estimators in the Treasury Department and in 
the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Revenue estimating is an inherently difficult task which requires 
15. Compare Reuben, Tax and PACs: Drawing the Connection, 29 TAX NOTES 1335, 1336 
(1985) (arguing that the complexity of the elective and legislative processes makes the drawing of 
a causal relationship between contributions and votes suspect); Schroedel, Campaign Contribu-
tions and Legislative Outcomes, 39 WESTERN POL. Q. 371 (1986) (asserting that whether contri-
butions affect votes depends upon the type of legislation) and Wright, PA Cs, Contributions and 
Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective, 19 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 400 (1985) (demonstrating the 
limited nature of PAC influence on congressional voting), with Doernberg & McChesney, On the 
Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REv. 913, 942-45 
(1987) (abundant anecdotal evidence exists to show that legislation is bought and sold, although 
there can be no conclusive proof). 
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that behavioral adjustments to tax law changes be estimated and taken 
into account. The degree of these behavioral responses can be widely 
misjudged. In 1981, for example, Treasury estimated that a proposed 
change to liberalize the availability of individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs) would cost $5.5 billion over three years. Instead, the enacted 
change lost $32 billion, almost six times more than the estimate, 
largely due to the significant marketing of IRAs by banks (pp. 86-87). 
The estimates simply failed to anticipate accurately the size of the be-
havioral response to the tax change. 16 
Problems with revenue estimates plagued the Treasury Depart-
ment (pp. 90-93, 107), the Ways and Means Committee (p. 148), the 
Finance Committee (pp. 260-61), and the Conference Committee (pp. 
272-75). In frustration, Senator Packwood publicly lashed out at 
David Brockway, the director of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
claiming that the Joint Committee was providing misinformation (p. 
275). The problem peaked during the tense reconciliation negotiations 
of the Conference Committee when new economic forecasts caused the 
Joint Committee staff to lower the expected revenues to be collected 
under the 1986 Act. Revenue estimates will continue to play an im-
portant role in the budget process because of budget deficits. A debate 
likely will occur over whether the econometric modeling process by 
which these estimates are made should be subject to any public 
scrutiny.17 
The concept of revenue neutrality may have been an essential con-
straint for the enactment of the 1986 Act. It led, however, to some 
rather bizarre gimmicks to compensate for revenue shortfalls, ones 
which would never have been considered without the imposition of 
this constraint. First, Treasury II contained a special "recapture" tax 
on sales of depreciable property. The recapture provisions were based 
on the argument that corporations would receive a windfall on sales of 
old equipment, since the equipment had been fully depreciated at a 46 
percent corporate tax rate, and any gain on the equipment sale would 
be taxed at a substantially lower corporate tax rate. Notwithstanding 
some merit to the argument, it was quickly dropped by the Ways and 
Means Committee. The Treasury ~I provision was designed to raise 
$56 billion, an amount determined by the revenue shortfall of the re-
16. For an excellent discussion of the likely failure of revenue estimators adequately to ac· 
count for behavioral responses to the 1986 Act, see Schmalbeck, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: 
The Impact on Support of Public Goods and Services, S DUKE L. MAG. 22 (1987) (detailed ac· 
count of the estimate of revenue gained by elimination of the deduction for state and local sales 
taxes). See also Nester, A Guide to Interpreting the Dynamic Elements of Revenue Estimates, in 
COMPENDIUM OF TAX REsEARCH 1987 at 13 (Office of Tax Analysis, Dept. of the Treasury) 
(1987). 
17. See Rosen, Tech Corrections May Be Delayed Until 1989; Revenue Estimating Generates 
Controversy, 38 TAX NOTES 435 (1988). 
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maining provisions of Treasury II, and in excess of any amount that 
the theory of the "recapture tax" would possibly raise (pp. 91-92, 108). 
When the Finance Committee faced a revenue shortfall, Senator 
Packwood proposed to repeal the business expense deduction for pay-
ment of excise taxes and tariffs (p. 195). This proposal was quickly 
rejected, however, when other committee members did not agree with 
the argument that these expenses were not ordinary costs of doing 
business. 
Two other gimmicks survived the process. Citizens for Tax Jus-
tice, a largely labor-supported organization, had publicized the fact 
that because of the capital investment incentives in the 1981 Act, large 
numbers of U.S. corporations reported profits in their financial state-
ments but paid no federal income taxes. In response to this problem, 
Congress enacted a stiff corporate minimum tax regime (which applies 
a 20 percent rate to a tax base defined more closely to economic in-
come than is "taxable income"). Congress further enacted a tax on 
one-half of the excess of the income reported by corporations for finan-
cial accounting purposes over the income determined under the alter-
native minimum tax. Thus, for the sake of appearance and the need 
for more revenue (p. 263), Congress imposed a tax regime on corpora-
tions that does not necessarily have any relationship to defining an 
appropriate income tax base. 
In an even more bizarre move, the 1986 Act only appears to enact 
a top marginal tax rate of 28 percent, instead, imposing a top marginal 
tax rate of 33 percent. This top rate is not even imposed on the 
wealthiest taxpayers as it ought to be under a schedule of graduated 
rates (pp. 89, 220, 263, 279). The 1986 Act rate schedule is divided 
into two brackets of 15 percent and 28 percent. The gimmick phases 
out the benefit of the lower 15 percent tax bracket and personal ex-
emptions for taxpayers having taxable income exceeding specified 
levels. The income tax liability of these taxpayers is increased by a 5 
percent surtax on a specified amount of their taxable income until the 
tax benefit of the 15 percent tax rate has been recaptured. Thus, the 
marginal tax rate on the income subjected to the 5 percent surtax is 33 
percent, the sum of the regular marginal tax rate of 28 percent plus the 
5 percent surtax. The rate adjustment begins at $71,900 of taxable 
income for married individuals, and $43, 150 of taxable income for sin-
gle individuals, and ends at points that vary with the number of per-
sonal exemptions. A single person with $44,000 taxable income pays a 
marginal tax rate of 33 percent, while a single person with taxable 
income of $1 million taxable income pays a marginal tax rate of 28 
percent! This gimmick was chosen because it yielded the appearance 
of a top marginal rate of 28 percent, but raised enough revenue to 
cover the estimated revenue shortfall predicted by the Conference 
Committee (p. 279). 
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Congress again applied the constraint of revenue neutrality in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. If the revenue estimates 
are correct, the Act is revenue neutral, but the Act's miscellany of 
income tax provisions was selected as much for the specific revenue 
that each provision would raise as for the contribution that it made to 
the design of a coherent income tax. 
II. OTHER THEMES FROM THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
A. What Happened to the Objective of Simplification? 
Let us go forward with an historic reform for fairness, simplicity, and in-
centives for growth. [President Reagan's State of the Union Address, 
January 25, 1984].18 
I hope you're not going to push simplification for simplification's sake. 
Simplification for the sake of simplification is to beat your brains out. To 
go through the whole process and wind up without a dime's dent in the 
deficit just doesn't make sense. [p. 189; Senator Bob Packwood speaking 
to President Reagan] 
In President Reagan's 1984 State of the Union address, he asked 
for a tax plan that was simple, fair, and good for the economy (p. 51). 
The title for Treasury I was taken from the President's speech: Tax 
Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth (p. 62). Birn-
baum and Murray could have drawn another useful theme from their 
narrative: What happened to the objective of a simpler income tax 
system? 
Two claims of greater simplification in the 1986 Act can be sub-
stantiated. First, because the Act substantially increases the standard 
deduction and personal exemption, fewer poor individuals will pay 
any tax at all, and among those who do pay taxes, substantially fewer 
will file an itemized tax return. Second, because the 1986 Act treats 
various types of investments more evenhandedly, taxpayers should 
spend less time trying to avoid paying taxes. Beyond these two sim-
plifications, however, the 1986 Act makes the income tax more 
complicated. 
The failure to achieve increased simplicity results from at least two 
factors. First, simplicity frequently competes with the other two 
objectives of fairness and efficiency. Two excellent examples of this 
phenomenon are the rules dealing with the time value of money and 
foreign tax credits.19 Both sets of rules attempt to achieve fairness and 
18. 1984 PUB. PAPERS 87, 90 (Jan. 25, 1984). 
19. See Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules. 42 TAX L. REV. 1 (1986). An entire issue 
of the Review is devoted to this 292-page article. See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 32242, 32245-53 (1987) (separate application of the foreign tax credit limitation with re· 
spect to separate categories of foreign source income); Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.904-7, 52 Fed. Reg. 
at 32253-60 (so-called look through rules as applied to controlled foreign corporations); Prop. 
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efficiency by applying theoretically sound constructs. These rules are 
so complex, however, that it becomes questionable whether such pris-
tine attacks on sophisticated tax avoidance are worthwhile. 
Congressional unwillingness to measure capital income correctly is 
a second factor causing complexity. Here the trade-off is the substitu-
tion of one type of complexity for another. The correct measurement 
of capital income is attainable, but it requires substantial complexity.20 
Interestingly, Treasury I attempted to measure capital income cor-
rectly by applying economic depreciation, indexing the tax base for 
inflation, repealing the special lower rate for capital gains, and elimi-
nating the double taxation on corporate earnings. In the 1986 Act, 
Congress chose instead to continue measuring capital income incor-
rectly, and to incorporate complex provisions (such as the interest lim-
itation rules) to counter the tax avoidance opportunities created by the 
mismeasurement of capital income. 
If income from capital is measured correctly, the interest expense 
on funds borrowed to make the investment is a correctly deductible 
expense. However, to the extent that Congress fails to tax income 
from capital correctly, Congress ought to eliminate correspondingly 
the deduction for interest expense on funds borrowed to make the in-
vestment. 21 For example, if a taxpayer borrows money to invest in 
state and local government tax-exempt bonds, the interest expense on 
the borrowed funds is not deductible because the interest income on 
the bonds is tax-exempt.22 The 1986 Act substantially limits the inter-
est deduction by requiring identification of the use of borrowed funds 
and the corresponding appropriateness of allowing an interest expense 
deduction. In order to apply these interest limitations rules, interest 
expense must now be divided through tracing rules into five categories: 
interest expense incurred in a trade or business, an investment activity, 
a passive activity, a personal activity, and home ownership! Each type 
of interest expense is then subjected to different limitation rules. 23 
Other complex rules attributable to the failure correctly to tax cap-
ital income include the capital gains and losses structure, the rules 
applicable to passive activity losses, and the alternative minimum tax. 
It is indeed ironic to read in Showdown at Gucci Gulch that when Sen-
ator Moynihan asked about the possibility of a one percent increase in 
the highest marginal tax rate in exchange for the indexing of capital 
Treas. Reg. § 1.904-8, 52 Fed. Reg. at 32260-63 (allocation of taxes to separate categories of 
income); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.904-9, 52 Fed. Reg. at 32263-65 (transition rules). These pro-
posed regulations cover thirty-nine pages in the Prentice-Hall tax service. 
20. See Gann, supra note 5, at 108-35. 
21. Id. at 116-22. 
22. I.R.C. § 265(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988). 
23. See Temp. Treas. Regs.§ 1.163-8T (allocation of interest expense among expenditures), 
§ 1.163-9T (personal interest), § 1.163-lOT (qualified residence interest). These temporary regu-
lations cover thirty-seven pages in the Prentice-Hall tax service. 
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gains, Assistant Secretary Roger Mentz replied that "he feared that it 
would be too complicated to administer. With that, indexing faded 
away" (p. 278). 
B. Measuring the Distributional Neutrality of the 1986 Act 
By raising corporate taxes, [Treasury I] was able to cut not only individual 
tax rates, but also individual tax bills. The plan offered taxpayers an 
average cut of 8.5 percent in their annual payments to Uncle Sam. [p. 60; 
emphasis in original ] 
The theme of distributional neutrality had been established early in 
the legislative process by both Senator Bradley and President Reagan 
(pp. 29, 40-41). Distributional neutrality means that tax legislative 
changes do not adjust the distribution of the tax burden among income 
groups. Distributional neutrality ostensibly was achieved under the 
1986 Act by lowering the rates and at the same time substantially 
broadening the income tax base to which the rates were applied.24 
Moveover, although the largest drop in marginal tax rates would be 
made with respect to the wealthy (the marginal tax rate was in fact 
dropped from 50 percent to 28 percent), it was argued that the corre-
sponding drop in revenues collected from the wealthy would be offset 
by increased revenues through base broadening, which would have its 
largest impact on the wealthy.2s 
Birnbaum and Murray do not question the claim that the various 
tax reform proposals achieved distributional neutrality. Nor do they 
appear to realize that measuring the distributional burden of income 
taxes is a very difficult calculation. Perhaps they ought not to be 
faulted too much for this omission, for the difficulties were largely ig-
nored by the experts in the Treasury Department, the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation, and the staffs of the congressional tax-writing 
committees as well. Perhaps the problems of measuring distributional 
burdens are so great that in the rush of writing and enacting legislation 
the experts deliberately chose to ignore the problems with their calcu-
lations. By ignoring them, however, these experts repeatedly made 
misleading statements that the various tax reform proposals were dis-
tributionally neutral. Their calculations were too primitive to support 
such assertions, for they typically ignored three adjustments: behav-
ioral response to the tax changes, the incidence of the corporate tax, 
and the existence of so-called implicit taxes. 
24. The calculation of taxes owed by any individual equals R x (Y - D), where R is the tax 
rate, Y is gross income, and D is the total of all deductions. For various combinations of R and 
(Y - D) (the tax base), the same taxes can be collected. 
25. See 1 U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND Eco· 
NOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 46-61 (1984). 
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1. Behavioral Response to Tax Changes 
As described earlier, 26 the econometric models used by revenue es-
timators attempt to anticipate taxpayer behavforal responses to tax 
changes in determining whether the proposed legislation is revenue 
neutral. If taxpayer behavioral adjustments are underestimated, the 
tax legislation will produce a revenue shortfall. Similarly, if such ad-
justments are ignored or underestimated, distributional neutrality pre-
dictions will typically overstate the tax burden to be paid by various 
income groups. For example, if the number of persons who would 
avoid paying the income tax through deposits to an IRA is underesti-
mated, then the revenue cost of the provision is understated and the 
distributional burden of the tax is overstated. 
2. Incidence of the Corporate Tax 
Corporations are artificial entities that nominally pay the corporate 
tax. The burden, or incidence, of all taxes is on individuals. Econo-
mists have applied sophisticated analyses to determine the incidence of 
the corporate tax. For example, the corporation may shift the tax to 
consumers of its products (through higher prices), to its employees 
(through lower wages), to its shareholders (through lpwer after-tax 
profits), or to all owners of capital (through reestablishnient of market 
equilibrium across all investors in capital after the corporate tax 
inqrease).27 
The 1986 Act is estimated to shift approximately $120 billion in 
taxes from individuals to nominal payments by corporations. 28 
Notwithstanding that the incidence of this increased corporate tax is 
on individuals, the distributional burden calculations were made solely 
with respect to the changes in the individual income tax. 29 The failure 
to account for the incidence of this shift yields statements such as 
those made by Birnbaum and Murray quoted in Part II, subsection B. 
By focusing solely on taxes explicitly paid by individuals (their "tax 
bills"), the estimated tax cuts could only be accidentally correct. 
Economist Martin Feldstein has proposed a method to calculate 
the distributional effects of the increased corporate tax burden of the 
26. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text. 
27. Fora summary of this research, seeJ. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 141-46 (5th ed. 
1987). 
28. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100rH CONG., lST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 at 1357, Table A-1 (JCS-10-87). 
29. See, e.g., id. at 17, Table 1-2 (JCS-10-87) (showing the percentage change made by the 
1986 Act in the distribution of the tax burden by income class, taking into account only changes 
in the individual income tax provisions). See also id. at 18, Table 1-3 (showing the average in-
come tax rate by income class before and after the 1986 Act, taking into account only changes in 
the individual income tax provisions). 
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1986 Act.30 His calculation imputes the increase in the corporate in-
come tax to individuals, assuming that the entire increase is borne by 
capital and that all capital bears the tax increase equally.31 Since own-
ers of capital are likely to be wealthy, one expects his calculations to 
demonstrate that the 1986 Act is not as distributionally neutral as 
claimed by the tax-writing committees, but rather redistributes the tax 
burden to wealthier individuals. His findings are summarized in Table 
1.32 
Column 2 of Table 1 shows the average individual tax liability for 
1988 calculated by applying the law prior to the 1986 Act. Column 3 
shows the corresponding average individual tax liability for 1988 ap-
plying the 1986 Act, conventionally calculated with no allowance 
made for the distributional impact of the corporate tax increase. Col-
umn 4 makes the conventional tax calculation of the average tax 
change at each income level. 33 The calculation in column 4 is then 
restated in column 5 as a percentage of the "old law" tax liability.34 
Thus, columns 2-5 state the conventional analysis supplied in reports 
of the Treasury Department, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and 
the tax-writing committees. 
Columns 6 through 10 present the calculations of the combined 
individual and corporate tax liabilities, assuming that the incidence of 
the corporate tax is on individual owners of capital. As expected, the 
total tax burden is increased because the corporate taxes are included. 
Column 6 combines the individual income tax from column 2 with the 
additional imputed corporate tax burden calculated under the law 
prior to the 1986 Act. Column 7 combines the individual income tax 
from Column 3 with the additional imputed corporate tax burden cal-
culated under the 1986 Act. The net change is shown in column 8. 
This change is then restated in column 9 as a percentage of the "old 
law" individual income tax liability of column 2, and restated again in 
column 10 as a percentage of the combined old individual and imputed 
corporate tax liability in column 6. 
A comparison of columns 4 and 8 shows the effect of ignoring the 
distributional burden of the corporate income tax. The increased cor-
30. Feldstein, Imputing Corporate Tax Liabilities to Individual Taxpayers, 41 NATL. TAX J, 
37 (1988). 
31. Id. at 3. Calculations of the combined federal and corporate income tax burden, assum-
ing that the corporate income tax is a tax on capital, are provided by Joseph A. Pechman in a 
letter to the editor. THE NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS, July 16, 1987, at 50. 
32. This table is taken from Feldstein, supra note 30, at 54, Table 4. 
33. Cf. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, Table 1-3, supra note 28, at 18. The Feldstein study 
shows a decline in total individual tax liabilities in column 4 of only $300 million, rather than the 
$25 billion individual tax cut estimated by the Joint Committee on Taxation. See JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, supra note 28. He suggests reasons for this discrepancy, and states that the 
reasons for the discrepancy are under investigation. Feldstein, supra note 30, at 55. 
34. Cf. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, Table 1-2, supra note 28, at 17. 
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porate tax burden reduced by half the reduction in tax burden on indi-
viduals with incomes between $10,000 and $20,000. This effect 
reflects the prevalence of older, retired, or partially retired individuals 
in these income classes. Comparing columns 5 and 10 at income levels 
above $100,000 demonstrates that the tax burden increase is higher 
when both the changes in the individual and corporate taxes are taken 
into account. 
3. Payment of Implicit Taxes3s 
The distributional calculations also ignore the effect of implicit 
taxes. The concept of implicit taxes can be illustrated by a tax-exempt 
bond example, as it typically is illustrated in law school classes. 36 
Example. Prior to the 1986 Act, Taxpayer A had a 50 percent 
marginal tax rate, the maximum under the "old" law. A had the op-
tion of investing in a taxable corporate bond bearing a 10 percent in-
terest rate, or in a tax-exempt bond issued by a state government 
bearing a 6 percent interest rate. The tax-exempt status of the state 
bond is" reflected in its lower interest rate. A wisely chose to invest in 
the tax-exempt bond, yielding a 6 percent tax-exempt return, rather 
than in the corporate bond, yielding an after-tax 5 percent return (be-
cause the 10 percent return is taxed at A's 50 percent marginal tax 
rate). By this choice, A pays no explicit tax but pays instead an im-
plicit tax of 40 percent in the forgone additional investment return that 
she would have earned on the corporate bond. This implicit tax can be 
viewed as a revenue-sharing mechanism - albeit an inefficient one -
between the federal and state governments, effectuated through the 
federal income tax system. By this mechanism, the federal govern-
ment forgoes a tax on the state bond interest, and a substantial part of 
this forgone tax inures to the benefit of the state government by lower-
ing its borrowing costs relative to other borrowers. 37 The federal gov-
ernment thereby offers a subsidy for public goods and services 
provided by the state government. Finally, note that A has a 6 percent 
return to invest or spend as she privately determines. 
Under the 1986 Act, A's marginal tax rate drops to 28 percent, the 
maximum marginal rate applied to wealthy individuals. Because the 
maximum marginal rate has dropped from 50 percent to 28 percent, 
the interest paid by state and local governments on tax-exempt bonds 
35_'\The only tax policy discussion of the 1986 Act's impact on implicit taxes that I have seen 
is in Scliipalbeck, supra note 16. This subpart draws heavily from his discussion. 
36. See, e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE 
TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 334-40 (4th ed. 1985) (using the tax-exempt bond 
example to illustrate the value of a tax preference). 
37. In the example given, ifthe bond principle is $1,000, the federal revenue lost by substitut-
ing an exempt bond for a taxable one is $50 per year. The local government interest subsidy is 
(10% - 6%) x $1,000, or $40 per year. The difference, $50 - $40, is the investor's net tax 
benefit. 
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will be a higher percentage of that paid on taxable corporate bonds. 
Assume that a new market equilibrium is reached, so that the interest 
rate on corporate bonds is 10 percent and that on tax-exempt bonds is 
8 percent. A wisely chooses to invest in the tax-exempt bond, yielding 
an 8 percent tax-exempt return, rather than the corporate bond, yield-
ing an after-tax 7.2 percent return (because the 10 percent return is 
taxed at A's marginal rate of 28 percent). A pays no explicit tax but 
pays instead an implicit tax of 20 percent in the forgone additional 
interest income that she would have earned on the corporate bond. 
Because of the 1986 Act, A's implicit tax has decreased from 40 per-
cent to 20 percent, and her investment return has increased from 6 
percent to 8 percent. 
The federal government coll,ects no explicit taxes from A either 
before or after the 1986 Act to 'spend on public goods and services. 
The federal government subsidizes the state government by lowering 
its borrowing costs, but the subsidy has been halved by the 1986 Act 
because the state government's borrowing costs have been increased 
from 6 percent to 8 percent. The state government has correspond-
ingly less to spend on public goods and services. 
Table 2 compares the results under this example before and after 
the 1986 Act. 
Characteristics 
Return on Corporate 
Bond 
Return on Tax-Exempt 
Bond 
Explicit Tax Paid to 
Federal Government 
Implicit Tax and 
Subsidy to State 
Government 
Total Amount Available 
for Public Goods and 
Services 
Total Amount Subject 
to Taxpayer's Private 
Control 
TABLE2 














This type of example can be repeated over and over again with 
respect to Internal Revenue Code provisions which permit an exclu-
sion from income (like the tax-exempt bond example) or a deduction 
from income (like a charitable contribution deduction). It is a well-
known phenomenon to economists and lawyers engaging in tax policy 
analysis. Many of these provisions were designed to achieve a social 
policy objective, such as support for education, implementation of pol-
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lution control equipment, rehabilitation of historic structures, or in-
vestment in equipment. These provisions are now typically referred to 
as "tax expenditure" provisions and are summarized as a part of the 
"actual federal budget."38 This portion of the budget estimates the 
amount of forgone federal government revenue that is channeled into 
various activities through each tax expenditure provision. 
The 1986 Act eliminated or reduced the generosity of many tax 
expenditure provisions. As illustrated by the tax-exempt bond exam-
ple, even if the Act did not modify a tax expenditure provision, two 
important phenomena resulted from the substantial lowering of the 
highest marginal rate from 50 percent to 28 percent: (a) the amount of 
implicit taxes paid by wealthy individuals engaged in the activities cov-
ered by tax expenditure provisions has been reduced; and (b) corre-
spondingly, the amount of forgone federal government revenues 
channeled through these provisions to purchase public goods and ser-
vices has been reduced. Distributional calculations would look quite 
different if the lowering of implicit taxes paid by wealthy individuals as 
a result of the 1986 Act were taken into account. Public finance econ-
omists ought to attempt to combine the work of Professor Feldstein, 
imputing the greater corporate tax burden to individuals, with an ad-
ditional effort to impute the loss in the implicit tax burden by lowering 
the maximum marginal tax rates from 50 percent to 28 percent. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Showdown at Gucci Gulch is an important narrative document that 
should be studied by those interested in the tax legislative process. 
Even if one admires the 1986 Act, there is much to disapprove in the 
legislative process that produced the Act. 
Traditionally, the Treasury Department has advocated sound tax 
policy, based on such touchstone principles as the Haig-Simon com-
prehensive definition of "income." It has operated as a counterweight 
to special interest lobbyists who directed their efforts at Congress. 
Treasury I is an excellent example of this important tradition.39 
Treasury II, however, is a political document produced under the di-
rection of Secretary Baker. Perhaps it was necessary for the Treasury 
to produce such a document to maintain a serious shot at accomplish-
ing the tax reform legislation that the President desired. Nevertheless, 
it is an unwelcome trend to the extent that future Treasury Depart-
ments may likewise be willing to operate in such a politically driven 
manner with respect to tax legislation.40 Congressional legislators ap-
38. See Special Analysis G, in SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-
ERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1988 at G-1. 
39. Another excellent example is U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX RE-
FORM (1977). 
40. The Joint Tax Committee estimated that the bill passed by the Senate leading to the 1986 
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pear also to have developed a voracious appetite to trade tax legislative 
votes for targeted transitional rules for particular constituents. Per-
haps these various adjustments in the tax legislative process are pre-
dictable under public choice theory; their predictability does not make 
them more welcome. 
Guidelines of revenue and distributional neutrality constrain the 
legislative process. Yet, the measurements necessary to apply these 
concepts of neutrality are very difficult to ascertain. The Treasury De-
partment and the Joint Committee on Taxation presumably have 
made serious econometric attempts to measure revenue neutrality cor-
rectly. Equally excellent efforts have not been directed at the correct 
measurement of distributional neutrality. Because of the budget defi-
cit, each Congress in the near future is likely to consider revenue legis-
lation under these same neutrality constraints. Debate will inevitably 
arise over the secrecy of the revenue-estimating process. The distribu-
tional analysis needs to be modified if the distributional neutrality con-
straint continues to be applied. Finally, as income tax revisions 
increasingly become the captive of the budget reconciliation process, 
the likelihood of enacting piecemeal legislation to achieve target reve-
nue will increase.41 This development will come at the expense of 
more systematic tax reform efforts to improve targeted areas of the 
Code, such as the rules applied to corporate acquisitions. 
As explained in this book, a bipartisan effort at tax reform was 
forged by the combination oflow rates (which attracted conservatives) 
and a broadened base (which attracted liberals). The 1986 Act has 
also garnered support from tax policy analysts from both camps. This 
coalition cannot help being viewed with some irony, however. Profes-
sor Boris Bittker has noted the decline and fall of progression through 
the tenure of the Reagan administration, in which the highest margi-
nal tax rates have dropped from 70 percent to 28 percent for the 
wealthiest.42 Nevertheless, Democratic leaders attended the October 
27, 1986, ceremony on the South Lawn as President Reagan signed the 
bill and regaled the crowd with the wonders of low tax rates. Perhaps 
the liberal Democrats were getting their "just deserts": since they had 
been loathe to acknowledge that the tax expenditure budget repre-
sented an implicit tax on the wealthy, it would hardly do for them now 
Act contained a $21 billion revenue shortfall. The Treasury Department had previously esti-
mated a revenue shortfall of $30 billion, but hid that fact from everyone except Senator 
Packwood. Its failure to disclose revenue estimates was a switch from traditional practice, in 
order not to impede the passage of the bill by the Senate. P. 261. 
41. See Handler, Budget Reconciliation and the Tax Law: Legislative History or Legislative 
Hysteria?, 37 TAX NOTES 1259 (1987). 
42. THE NEW YORK REv. OF BOOKS, July 16, 1987, at 49 (letter to the editor). Professor 
Bittker points out that nominally progressive tax rates were not irrelevant, because reported 
revenue statistics showed that in 1981, 13% of personal income tax revenues came from income 
taxed at 50%, and that in 1982, 15% came from income taxed at 49-50%. Id. 
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to complain about the lower explicit tax rates, but the "distributionally 
neutral" tax, on the wealthy. This irony escaped the writers of Show-
down at Gucci Gulch. 43 
43. It also escaped Albert R. Hunt, the Washington bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal, 
who wrote in the introduction to Showdown at Gucci Gulch: 
Whatever the economic and political effects, the truc·reform bill is a monumental piece of 
social legislation. It takes more than four million poor people off the federal income tax 
rolls, the most important antipoverty measure enacted over the past decade. And the attack 
on individual and corporate true shelters makes it unlikely that wealthy individuals or busi· 
nesses will be able to escape paying any truces and thus might restore some of the eroding 
confidence Americans feel in the true system. P. xvi. 
